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We investigate the effects of various design features of all-
pay auction crowdsourcing sites by conducting a field 
experiment on Taskcn, one of the largest crowdsourcing 
sites in China where all-pay auction mechanisms are used. 
Specifically, we study the effects of price, reserve price in 
the form of the early entry of high-quality answers (shill 
answers), and reputation systems on answer quantity and 
quality by posting translation and programming tasks on 
Taskcn. We find significant price effects on both the 
number of submissions and answer quality, and that tasks 
with shill answers have pronounced lower answer quality, 
which are consistent with our theoretical predictions. In 
addition, monetary incentives and the existence of shill 
answers have different effects on users with differing 
experience and expertise levels. 
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BACKGROUND 
One of the most remarkable and transformative potentials 
of the Internet lies in its ability to change people's 
collaborative work, especially in collecting intellectual 
contributions from disparate peer users on a large scale. 
This trend has manifested itself in various familiar 
examples such as open source projects, Wikipedia, 
Question-and-Answer (Q&A) forums, and social content 
and tagging sites such as Flickr, Del.icio.us and YouTube. 
In one type of collaboration called “crowdsourcing” tasks 
are directly outsourced to individual workers through public 
solicitation (Howe, 2006; Kleeman, Voss, & Rieder, 2008). 
Crowdsourcing sites have been rapidly growing in number, 
popularity, and research attention. For example, 
Taskcn.com, one of the earliest sites to have been studied, 
is a Chinese website where people post diverse tasks (e.g., 
design a company logo or translate a research statement) 
with a monetary reward for other users to compete for by 
submitting solutions (Yang, Adamic, & Ackerman, 2008). 
Amazon's Mechanical Turk is designed to invoke human 
labor to accomplish “human intelligence tasks” (HITs) 
requested by users with specified compensation (Mason & 
Watts, 2009).  
Unlike many other kinds of “peer contributed” sites like 
Wikipedia or Flickr, crowdsourcing sites are task-driven 
with arbitrary requirements (or expectations) such as 
completion time, quality, or other features. These semi- or 
well-defined “tasks” might inspire less intrinsic motivation 
derived from some form of social reward (Nov, Naaman, & 
Ye, 2008) than free-structured and undefined contribution 
tasks. Thus, financial incentives have been increasingly 
incorporated into the design of crowdsourcing services. For 
example, Taskcn and Amazon's Mechanical Turk both 
allow requesters to set up monetary rewards in order to 
incentivize contributors. Q&A forums, such as Yahoo! 
Answers (Zhang, Adamic, Ackerman, & Bakshy, 2008), 
and the now-defunct Google Answers (Chen, Ho, & Kim, 
2010) have employed varied incentive schemes to 
outsource knowledge or expertise requests. These schemes 
range from semi-market-like flat-rate virtual currency in 
Yahoo! Answers and virtual currency with a flexible rate as 
in Baidu Knows and Naver Knowledge to real-market-like 
Google Answers where real money is offered in exchange 
for knowledge or expertise. 
Whether and how incentives can motivate more and better 
contributions have been the primary questions concerning 
economists and sociologists. Field experiments conducted 
on a series of Q&A sites have indicated that a higher 
reward can induce more answer submissions, but yield 
mixed results regarding answer quality (Chen et al. 2010; 
Harper, Raban, Rafaeli, & Konstan, 2008). Consistent 
results are found on Amazon's Mechanical Turk where 
financial incentives increase the quantity of contributions, 
but not quality (Mason & Watts, 2009). Similar results 
proving that higher awards elicit more answers are also 
found in field studies on Taskcn (Yang et al., 2008) and 
NaverKnowledge-In (Nam, Adamic, & Ackerman, 2009). 
However, this does not paint a complete picture due to the 
inherent complications of differing types of required 
knowledge, tasks, incentive schemes, and communities. For 
example, although the amount of monetary award is 
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 significantly correlated with the number of submissions on 
Taskcn, it could be confounded with the fact that people 
post higher prices for tasks that require a high level of 
expertise (Yang et al., 2008). A controlled field 
experiments for revealing how this crowdsourcing 
mechanism works in the context of the Internet knowledge 
market is therefore required. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We model the exchange mechanism on Taskcn as the all-
pay auction in economics. Specifically, any user can submit 
an answer to a task and each task gets many different 
answers. Since every user who submits a solution expends 
effort regardless of whether or not they win, the knowledge-
exchange mechanism is analogous to an all-pay auction 
where everyone pays for their bids in the form of individual 
effort, but only the winner gets paid. 
Following Segev and Sela (2011), we characterize the sub-
game perfect equilibria of incomplete information all-pay 
auctions. In particular, we predict how different monetary 
incentives and the existence of a reserve-price affect 
players’ participation and effort level. In detail, we show (1) 
higher rewards induce more participation and more effort; 
(2) higher reserve price decreases the number of 
participation. Furthermore, there is an optimal reserve price 
which generates the highest effort. It implies that if the 
reserve price is too high, it will decrease individuals’ effort.  
The complete model and proof can be found on the 
corresponding author’s website.1 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We use a 2x3 factorial design to investigate the price and 
the reserve price effects on users' behaviors. Specifically, 
we are interested in understanding whether tasks with 
higher rewards would attract more submissions as well as 
higher answer quality. We are also interested in 
determining whether a high-quality answer posted early can 
deter the entry of late answers, especially if it is posted by a 
user with a history of winning on the site. 
Task Selection: Programming and Translation Tasks 
We choose to use translation and programming tasks for 
this experiment, as the quality of these two types of tasks is 
quite standard and objective. 
For programming tasks, we collected 28 real programming 
problems from students at the University of Michigan 
School of Information, consisting of 14 Javascript and 14 
Perl tasks. All these tasks were not searchable and had 
practical implications. In the experiment, they were 
randomly assigned to different price treatments. We were 
unable to provide shill answers for programming tasks due 
to their difficulty. Consequently, we only used translation 
tasks in the shill treatments. 
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For translation tasks, we selected two types of translation 
work: personal statements collected from Chinese graduate 
students at the University of Michigan and company 
introductions downloaded from Chinese websites. We 
chose these two types of translation tasks because they are 
challenging, requiring a high level of skill and effort 
compared to other types of translation work, such as 
translating a CV. For each translation in shill treatments, we 
provided a shill answer which was either provided by the 
personal statements' owners or created by two of our 
undergraduate research assistants. To ensure that the shill 
answer had a relatively high quality, we asked one Chinese 
student to translate each company introduction from 
Chinese to English, and then asked the other American 
student to revise it. 
Treatments 
To investigate the price effects, we choose two prices for 
our tasks: 100 Yuan and 300 Yuan. First, as 100 yuan, is 
the empirical median price for both programming and 
translation tasks, it guarantees a certain amount of 
participation, even for low-price treatments. Second, the 
gap between 100 and 300 is salient enough for us to 
observe price effects on users' behaviors. Altogether, we 
have six different treatments in this experiment: 
 
1. High Price, No Shill: each task is posted with 300 
Yuan as a reward. 
2. High Price, Shill without credit: each task is 
posted with 300 Yuan as a reward. On average, 
within three hours after the task is posted, we post 
a shill answer. Each shill is posted under a 
different user’s name. 
3. High Price, Shill with credit: each task is posted 
with 300 Yuan as a reward. Averagely, within 
three hours after the task is posted, we post a shill 
answer using an existing account on Taskcn. The 
owner of this account has 4 credits, representing a 
relatively high winning record on the site. Users 
earn 1 credit whenever they earn 100 yuan on the 
site. We developed this shill account by 
participating in some tasks before the experiment. 
4. Low Price, No Shill: same as treatment 1 except 
that the reward is 100 yuan. 
5. Low Price, Shill without credit: same as treatment 
2 except that the reward is 100 yuan. 
6. Low Price, Shill with credit: same as treatment 3 
except that the reward is 100 yuan. 
Experiment Procedure 
We posted 148 tasks on Taskcn from June 3 - June 22, 
2009, 8 tasks per day. We select a single winner for each 
task. To avoid reputation effects from the askers' side, we 
used different Taskcn identities for each task by creating 
148 new accounts. Therefore, each task was posted by a 
unique user ID with no history. After a task was posted, any 
user could participate and submit their answers within 7 
days. After the seventh day, we selected one answer as the 
winner and the shill is never selected as the winner. 
HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we describe our hypotheses comparing 
users' behaviors between different treatments based on our 
theoretical predictions. We are interested in two outcome 
measures: participation and answer quality. Specifically, we 
have the following hypotheses: 
1. A task with a high reward attracts more 
submissions than a task with a low reward. 
2. A task with a high reward attracts answers of 
higher quality than a task with a low reward. 
3. The early entry of a high-quality answer (the shill 
answer) will deter the entry of others, 
consequently, the total amount of participation in 
shill treatments will be less than in the no-shill 
treatments. Furthermore, this shill effect on the 
number of participation is more salient in shill-
with-credit treatments than in shill-without-credit 
treatments. 
4. The average answer quality will be lower in shill 




The rating protocol here is similar to the one used in Chen 
et al. (2010). For the translation tasks, nine Chinese 
graduate students were recruited from the University of 
Michigan. The majority of them were masters students at 
the School of Information. As the school requires a TOEFL 
score of at least 600 when admitting international students, 
they all had relatively high reading and writing skills in 
English as non-native speakers. For the programming tasks, 
three Chinese graduate students were recruited from the 
University of Michigan, School of Information. All of them 
had an undergraduate major in computer science and 
several years of experience in web programming. 
As there were 3671 translation answers in total, the nine 
raters were randomly assigned to three different rating 
groups. Raters within each group independently rated the 
same question-answer pairs. On the other hand, the three 
programming raters rated all programming tasks due to the 
small number of answers for programming tasks.  
All raters followed the same rating procedure for each 
question-answer pair. For each question, we randomly 
selected one machine translation from the answer pool as 
well as all non-machine translations. All the rating 




To improve the reliability of students' ratings, we conducted 
training sessions before the rating sessions began. For 
translation tasks, we gave raters one sample personal 
statement and company introduction, then asked them to 
rate the difficulty of both questions. We also gave them two 
answers for each question and asked them to rate each 
answer's quality. One of the answers was written by the 
personal statement provider or our two undergraduate 
research assistants, and the other was randomly drawn from 
the answers that we received from the pilot session. For the 
programming task, we follow the same procedure with two 
sample questions. In addition, to help raters develop and 
refine their own personal rating scales instead of 
encouraging consensus among them, we asked them to 
individually give reasons for their rating scores for each 
question-answer pair.  
From October 2009 to February 2010, we conducted 45 
rating sessions at the University of Michigan, School of 
Information Laboratory. Each session lasted two hours to 
prevent fatigue. Students were paid a flat fee of $15 per 
hour to compensate them for their time. We used intra-class 
correlation coefficients to measure inter-rater reliability. 
The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) for translation 
answer quality in each group is: 0.90, 0.88, 0.68 and it is 
0.49 for programming answers, representing a good-to-
excellent reliability. 
The Price Effect 
We first examine how different prices affect participation. 
Due to the existence of machine translations and answers 
copied from others, we examined the quantity of all 
submissions and the quantity of human answers separately 
(for translation tasks). The criteria for human answers, 
which represent a certain amount of effort, are therefore: (1) 
not machine-translated; and (2) not copied from others. 
We find that no matter which type of the answer they 
receive, translation tasks in high-price treatments always 
have more submissions compared to tasks in low-price 
treatments (Average Number of Submissions/Question: All 
Answers: 35 vs. 26, p<0.01; Human Answers: 6 vs. 3, 
p<0.01, one-sided two-sample t-test). 
Next, we examine the price effect on human answer quality. 
Using an ordered probit specification with standard error 
clustered at the question level, we find that the average 
quality of human translation answers is higher in high-price 
treatments than in low-price treatments (Average Median 
Quality: 5.06 vs. 4.76, p=0.028, one-sided). Consistently, 
the quality of the best translation answer is higher in high-
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 price treatments than in low-price treatments (Average 
Median Quality: 6.04 vs. 5.67, p=0.012, one-sided). 
Regarding programming tasks, we find consistent price 
effect on both participation and answer quality 
(Submission: p=0.068; Quality: p=0.027, one-sided).  
The Reserve-Price (Shill) Effect 
In this section, we analyze the reserve-price (shill) effect on 
answerers' behaviors. Due to the significant higher answer 
quality of shill answers than others, we expect to observe 
fewer submissions and lower answer quality in shill 
treatments compared to no-shill treatments as it leaves little 
room for others to improve, particularly if the shill answer 
is posted by a user with credits.  
Although there is no significant shill effect on participation, 
the average quality of human translation answers is lower in 
the two shill treatments than in the no-shill treatments 
(Average Median Quality: 4.71 (4.80) vs. 5.29, p<0.01, 
one-sided). Furthermore, the quality of the best answer is 
lower in the shill treatments compared to the no-shill 
treatments (Average Median Quality: 5.69 (5.63) vs. 6.24, 
p<0.01, one-sided).  
Individuals' Entry 
Lastly, we investigate how different types of users choose 
to participate in tasks. As the mode of users’ credits, which 
approximate their winning experiences, is 0, we categorize 
users into two types: (1) experienced users whose credits 
are greater than 0; (2) inexperienced users who never win 
before the experiment.  
We compute the proportion of high-price tasks undertaken 
by each user and find that experienced users are less likely 
to choose high price tasks than inexperienced users (All 
Answers: 0.70 vs. 0.75, p=0.02; Human Answers: 0.75 vs. 
0.90, p<0.01, one-sided two-sample t-test). In addition, 
using Kolmogorov-Smirno Test, we find the cumulative 
distribution function (cdf) of average user credit for each 
question between the high price treatment and the low price 
treatment is significantly different (p=0.031, one-sided). 
Next, we examine how the existence of shill answers 
influences each type of user's behaviors. Specifically, 
experienced users are significantly less likely to choose 
tasks with shill answers than inexperienced users (All 
Answers: 0.77 vs. 0.81, p=0.017; Human Answers: 0.75 vs. 
0.88, p<0.01, one-sided two-sample t-test). Moreover, the 
cdf of average user credit for each question between shill 
and no shill treatments is significant ($p=0.047$, one-
sided). These two results indicate that experienced users are 
more strategic when choosing tasks with different monetary 
incentives and more likely to observe others' behaviors 
before participation. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we studied different design features of 
crowdsourcing sites with an all-pay auction mechanism by 
conducting a field experiment on Taskcn. By manipulating 
the monetary incentive and the existence of a reserve price 
in the form of a good shill answer, we find that higher price 
induces more participation and higher answer quality. 
Furthermore, the existence of a reserve price lowers the 
answer quality in general and the individual analysis shows 
that it is because of the less entry from experienced users. 
In addition, to increase their winning probability, 
experienced users are more strategic regarding their 
participation in tasks with different monetary incentives 
(resp. reserve prices). We hope our results can have 
implications in the design of crowdsourcing sites.  
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